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Abstract
Mobile Internet Protocol version 6 (MIPv6) adds the mobility function to
IPv6. An IPv6 host that supports the Mobile IPv6 function can move around the
IPv6 Internet. A connection between two nodes is maintained by the pairing of the
source address and the destination address. The IPv6 node address is assigned based
on the prefix of home network. The assigned address on a given network becomes
invalid when the host leaves that network and attaches itself to another network.
The reason for this problem came from the nature of IP addresses when a node
visits a foreign network: it is still reachable through the indirect packet forwarding
from its home network. This triangular routing feature supports node mobility but
increases the communication latency between nodes.
So it can be supposed to be overcome by using a Binding Update (BU)
scheme, which let nodes to update IP addresses and communicate with each other
through direct IP routing. To protect the security of Binding Update, a Return
Routability (RR) procedure is developed which results vulnerable to many attacks.
In Route Optimization, the mobile node sends the binding message to its peer node,
the  message contains the new address of the mobile node, called as Care of
Address, which confirms that the mobile node is infect moved to the new location
from its Home Network. After receiving the binding message, the peer node sends
all packets which are destined to the Mobile’s Home Address to the Care of
Address.
There are many security risks involved, when a malicious node might be able to
create a connection with the mobile node by sending the false binding messages.
By doing so malicious node can divert the traffic, can launch the DOS Attacks and
can also resend the authenticated messages, etc. So considering these security
issues, we will discuss for a secure protocol which prevents the attacker to establish
false connections and assures the secrecy and integrity of the mobile node and its
peers.
Keywords: Mobile Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6), Home Agent, Care of
Address, DOS attacks, Security
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1. Introduction
The Internet Protocol (IP) makes possible the connection in a wireless and non-
wireless network. Mobile IP support different  mobile data and wireless networking
applications like Wireless local area networks WLAN , Wireless wide area
networks, Wireless personal area networks (WPAN), Broadband wireless access
network (BWA)etc,[13].IPv6 is an IP-layer protocol that is designed to provide
mobility support. It allows an IPv6 node to arbitrarily change its location in the IPv6
network while maintaining the same IP address. Route optimization in Mobile IPv6
is used to eliminate inefficient triangle routing, [1].Different methods were
proposed to secure route optimization like: Return routability (RR) which is an
infrastructure less, lightweight procedure that enables a Mobile IPv6 node to request
another IPv6 node to check and test the ownership of its permanent address in both
home network and current visited network. RR protocol is used only to protect
messages but can not detect or prevent an attacker tampering against data, [13].To
ensure the accuracy and integrity of the collected data, the Network Time Protocol
(NTP) was used between the packet generator (Mobile Node) and packet receiver
(Correspondent Node) to synchronize the time. The aim is to make communication
between Mobile Node and Correspondent Node as secure as IPV4 today, [13].
2. Mobile IPv6 Mobility
Mobility is becoming an increasingly critical need because of the inclusion of IP
stacks in PDAs, mobile phones, and various forms of notebooks and PCs. The goal
of mobility is to perform intended service anytime, anywhere, anyhow, [13]. In
IPV6 any node can be a mobile or stationary node, as we cannot differentiate
between mobile and stationary node just looking on the IPV6 address [3]. Like
stationary nodes, a mobile node is attached to a particular network, known as its
home network.  In Figure1 is shown the Mobile IPv6 architecture. A mobile host,
called mobile node (MN), may have multiple IP addresses at the same time. When it
is currently attached to its home network, it is only addressed by its home address
(HoA) (Fig.2). The Home Address remains unchanged regardless of where the
mobile node is attached to the Internet, unless its home subnet prefix is changed.
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The home agent (HA) is a router on the mobile node’s home link. Any node
communicating with a mobile node is called a correspondent node (CN). It may be
either a stationary node or a mobile node. An IPv6 address can be divided into two
parts: the first part is the subnet prefix, and the second part is the interface identifier.
An IPv6 node periodically broadcasts Router Solicitation messages and waits for
Router Advertisement messages. The IPv6 node can thus discover the subnet prefix
from the Router Advertisement message, and then combine this subnet prefix with
its own embedded Media Access Control (MAC) address to form a new IPv6
address. This feature in IPv6 is called auto-configuration. A Mobile Node is able to
acquire a temporary local address, called the Care-of Address (CoA) without the use
of a foreign agent (FA). The Home Agent remembers the association between the
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Home Address and the Care-of Address of a mobile node, referred to as “binding”.
When a (MN) is away from its home network, all messages sent to its Home
Address will be routed to the Mobile Node by its Home Agent. The (HA) keeps a
binding list (called Binding Cache) so that it is able to know the current binding
between a HoA and a CoA. A Mobile Node registers and updates its primary CoA
associated with its HoA by sending a Binding Update (BU) message to the Home
Address. (Figure3).
Figure .3
Wherever it is, any packet sent to the MN in its HoA will be forwarded to its CoA
from Its HA. Even if an MN moves to a new network, all packets of its existing
transport-layer sessions will be routed to its new CoA. This is called bidirectional
tunneling in Mobile IP. Mobile IPv6 provides security between the HA and the MN
by a secure tunnel with IPSec. Packets from the CN are routed to the HA; then they
will be encapsulated in the IPSec headers and destined to the MN and vice-versa
(Figure 3). The HA decapsulates these packets, and then forwards them to the
destination. The CN working this scenario does not need to implement the Mobile
IP protocol. In addition, it is notable that the communication link between the CN
and the HA is not secure. In order to improve the efficiency of routing data packets,
Mobile IPv6 defines a route optimization (RO) procedure which improves
reliability by reducing dependence on the home network, the HA and the path to
and from it.
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Figure 4
3. Route Optimization Protocol
To enhance the performance, Route Optimization protocol is used. Route
optimization is a technique which enables a mobile node and a correspondent node
to communicate directly, bypassing the home agent completely, [4]. The concept of
route optimization is that, when the mobile node receives the first tunneled
message, it informs correspondent node about its new location, i.e. care-of-address,
by sending a binding update message. The correspondent node stores the binding
between the home address and care-of address into its Binding Cache, [5].
Route Optimization provides four main operations and these are:
a. Updating binding caches,
b. Managing smooth handoffs between foreign agents,
c. Acquiring registration keys for smooth handoffs,
d. Using special tunnels.
a. Updating binding caches: Binding caches are maintained by correspondent
nodes for associating the home address of a mobile node with its care-of address. A
binding cache entry also has an associated lifetime after which the entry has to be
deleted from the cache. If the correspondent node has no binding cache entry for a
mobile node, it sends the message addressed to the mobile node's home address.
When the home agent intercepts this message, it encapsulates it and sends it to the
mobile node's care-of address. It then sends a Binding Update message to the
correspondent node informing it of the current mobility binding.
b. Managing smooth handoffs between foreign agents: When a mobile node
registers with a new foreign agent, the basic Mobile IP does not specify a method to
inform the previous foreign agent. Thus the datagram in flight which had already
tunneled to the old care-of address of the mobile node are lost. This problem is
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solved in Route Optimization by introducing smooth handoffs. Smooth handoff
provides a way to notify the previous foreign agent of the mobile node's new
mobility binding. If a foreign agent supports smooth handoffs, it indicates this in its
Agent Advertisement message. When the mobile node moves to a new location, it
requests the new foreign agent to inform its previous foreign agent about the new
location as part of the registration procedure. The new foreign agent then constructs
a Binding Update message and sends it to the previous foreign agent of the mobile
node. Thus if the previous foreign agent receives packets from a correspondent node
having an out-of-date binding, it forwards the packet to the mobile node's care-of
address. It then sends a Binding Warning message to the mobile node's home agent.
The home agent in turn sends a Binding Update message to the correspondent node.
This notification also allows datagram sent by correspondent nodes having out-of-
date binding cache entries to be forwarded to the current care-of address.
c. Acquiring registration keys for smooth handoffs: For managing smooth
handoffs, mobile nodes need to communicate with the previous foreign agent. This
communication needs to be done securely as any careful foreign agent should
require assurance that it is getting authentic handoff information and not arranging
to forward in-flight datagram to a bogus destination. For this purpose a registration
key is established between a foreign agent and a mobile node during the registration
process. The following methods for establishing registration keys have been
proposed in the order of declining preference:
• If the home agent and the foreign agent share a security association, the home
agent can choose the registration key.
• If the foreign agent has a public key, it can again use the home agent to supply the
registration key.
• If the mobile node includes its public key in its Registration Request, the foreign
agent can choose the new registration key.
d. Using special tunnels: When a foreign agent receives a tunneled datagram for
which it has no visitor list entry, it concludes that the node sending the tunneled
datagram has an out-of-date binding cache entry for the mobile node. If the foreign
agent has a binding cache entry for the mobile node, it should re-tunnel the
datagram to the care-of address indicated in its binding cache entry. On the other
hand, when a foreign agent receives a datagram for a mobile node for which it has
no visitor list or binding cache entry, it constructs a special tunnel datagram. The
special tunnel datagram is constructed by encapsulating the datagram and making
the outer destination address equal to the inner destination address. This allows the
home agent to see the address of the node that tunneled the datagram and prevent
sending it to the same node. This avoids a possible routing loop that might have
occurred if the foreign agent crashed and lost its state information.
4. Security and Threats
Route optimization protocol makes mobile IPV6 more vulnerable. The attacker can
either corrupt binding message, or it can change the destination address so that
packets to be delivered to the false address of the attacker. Secrecy and integrity of
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communication is no more valid and can lead to denial-of-service (DoS) attacks.
Different attacks which are possible in MIPV6 are described as follow:
4.1. Attacks against Address 'Owners' ("Address Stealing"): In address stealing
an attacker illegitimately claims to be a given node at a given address, [2] and tries
to "steal" traffic destined to that address. It is the most dangerous attack, where
traffic reaches to the malicious node instead of reaching to the actual destination.
There are different variant of this attack;
4.1.1. Basic Address Stealing: If Binding Updates were not authenticated at all [2],
an attacker can send spoofed binding updates from anywhere in the Internet. Any
IPv6 address any node including stationary node as well, is vulnerable.
4.1.2. Attacks against Secrecy and Integrity: By spoofing Binding Updates, an
attacker could redirect all packets between two communicating nodes to itself, [2].
Sending a false BU to correspondent node, the attacker could get control over the
data intended between MN and CN. It means that attacker can hijack the
connections opened between them. The attacker could also launch man-in the-
middle attack by sending spoofed BU to both MN and CN.  By doing so all traffic
between two nodes will pass through the attacker.  Hence, the attacker would be
able to see and modify the packets sent between MN and CN.
4.1.3. Basic Denial-of-Service Attacks: By this attack, the attacker prevents the
legitimate node to access the resources of the node (victim of attack). This attack
might stop or disrupt communication between the nodes, [2]. This attack can be
launched on any Internet node.
4.1.4. Replaying Binding Updates: An attacker may replay the binding message
which is previously authenticated by the correspondent node.  Hence attacker can
direct packets to the mobile node's previous location.
4.2. Basic Flooding: In this attack, the attacker redirects heavy data stream, which
is intended for Mobile Node from Correspondent Node, to the target address. This
attack is serious in nature because by doing so target receiving cache is over flood,
which also lead to DoS attacks.
4.3. Reflection and Amplification: In this attack, attacker forces node to send more
number of packets to the target than the attacker sent to the node. Reflection is
particularly dangerous as packets are being reflected multiple times. If packets are
sent into a looping path, this can halt the target node as well as the sender.
5. Securing Route Optimization
We can secure the route optimization by using PKI with IPSec, [6]. But the protocol
must work between any mobile node and any other Internet node that have no
previous relationship, and so we cannot assume the existence of a global PKI or
other global security infrastructure, [6].  Many approaches were suggested by
different authors to make route optimization secure, which prevents all of the major
threats, which were described above. But those approaches cost in terms of packets,
delay and processing is excessive. Here the goal has been to propose a complete
protocol whose security is close to that of a static IPv4 based Internet, and whose
cost in terms of packets, delay and processing is not excessive. In our approach we
use the idea of public and private key, but without PK Infrastructure. The idea is
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simple, Correspondent Node generates the pair of public and private key, any other
Internet node doesn’t need to verify the public key of the Correspondent Node.
Same for Home Agent, which generates the  public and private key pair for all of its
connected  nodes (including Mobile Node), and handover each different  pair to the
particular node, and Home Agent  makes the entry  into its database that which pair
of key is assigned to  which node. Home Agent acts like a Certification authority
(CA), for the connected nodes. So assume that the MN moves to the new location
and registers its new care-of address with the Home Agent. Any message from
Correspondent Node, which was communicating with Mobile Node, is tunneled to
the mobile’s care-of-address by Home Agent, (As Shown in Fig.1a).On receiving
the tunneled message, the route optimization protocol is activated; in which MN
directly communicates to the Correspondent Node. On receiving first tunneled
packet by HA, RO is initiated in which MN sends BU message to the
Correspondent Node; As Binding Update is not authenticated yet so Correspondent
Node rejects the packet. As shown in Fig. 1 (b), Correspondent Node sends public
key in plain text to the mobile’s home address. The HA intercepts the message and
forwards it to the MN via a secure tunnel. The MN then encrypts its BU with the
public key of CN.
Request = [EncCN_pub (BU)]
This mechanism is called  return-routability test for  the home address because the
mobile node must  return to the correspondent (a function of) a value  sent by the
correspondent to the home address .This way, the correspondent verifies that the
mobile is  associated with its home agent and it can receive  messages at its
home address.   This protocol avoids from the Basic Address Stealing, because the
attacker cannot illegitimately claims to be  a given node at a given address due to
the return routability test for the home address, where Correspondent Node verifies
that the Mobile Node’s original attachment with the  Home Network. Attacks
against Secrecy and Integrity are also not possible in a sense that BU is encrypted
with the public key of CN, thus only Correspondent Node is able to decrypt that
message. Reflection and Amplification is also not possible due  to the fact that
Correspondent Node only sends one packet, i.e. public  key to the HA on receiving
one packet, i.e. BU.  This variant of protocol is sufficient to authenticate the sender
of the binding update, but the sender can send false BU, and can launch the attacks
such as Basic Denial-of-Service Attacks, Replaying Binding Updates and Basic
Flooding etc. So some variations are required in the above protocol.
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Now we modify the idea and we say that Correspondent Node sends a Nonce to the
MN, as shown in Fig. 5a, When the Correspondent node receives the packet; it
decrypts the packet by its private key and gets the BU out of the packet. CN then
generates a Nonce and sends this Nonce directly to Mobile Node, to verify that
whether the MN’s address is same as mentioned in BU. MN will reply to CN by
sending the same Nonce. This proves to the CN that the mobile is able to receive
messages sent to the new care-of address.  This mechanism is called return-
routability (RR) test for the care-of address [7]. Now attacker cannot launch
Replaying Binding Updates Attack, because the attacker cannot re-authenticate the
BU message, as correspondent will not receive any acknowledgement (Nonce) from
MN’s old address, so CN will not authenticate the address. Basic Denial-of Service
Attacks are still possible because the attacker can initiate the communication and
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sends the false BU. When CN will send Nonce to verify the target position, and then
attacker steals the packet and sends the same Nonce to the correspondent. The CN
will verify and start sending traffic to the unwanted node. This attack becomes more
severe when the attacker initiates CN to send the video stream to the target. We may
say that Correspondent Node will soon stop transmitting the video stream because it
does not receive acknowledgments from the target node. Unfortunately, this does
not work much because the attacker can spoof the acknowledgments. In this case,
the attacker initiates the communication and received the first packets of the data
stream; so it knows the initial TCP sequence numbers and can spoof TCP
acknowledgments. The attacker only needs to send one acknowledgment per TCP
window, which will cause CN to send a large data stream to the target. As recipient
of unwanted TCP packets usually sends a TCP Reset signal to the source of the
packets, which puts in immediate stop to the data stream. So readers may say that
target can stop the communication by sending TCP Reset signal. Unfortunately, this
does not work as well in our case. The packets sent by CN to the target have a
routing header that says the packets are intended for HA [reference 6]. When the IP
layer in the target stack processes the routing header, it encounters a strange address
i.e. home address of the target, and drops the packet without ever processing the
following TCP header. Thus, no TCP Reset will ever be sent. This problem can be
tackled by securing the communication between MN and CN while BU is being
authenticated.
Request = [EncCN_pub (BU + MN_Pub Key)] EncMN_Pub (Nonce) EncCN_Pub
(Nonce)
MN sends its BU message and its public key, both encrypted by the public key of
the CN. CN generates the Nonce and sends it by encrypting with the public key of
MN, where MN decrypts the message and gets the Nonce and verifies that desired
CN had replied. It then sends the same Nonce, encrypted by the public key of CN,
to CN. Where CN decrypts the message and gets back the same Nonce, which it
sent to MN. Now CN can now that MN is actually moved to the new location and
its new location is also verified.  Now attacker cannot launch  Basic Denial-of-
Service Attacks and  Basic Flooding Attacks because the communication between
MN and CN is secured while BU is being authenticated,  so attacker cannot send
spoofed BU, because the destination address in BU is  authenticated securely. In
this way the protocol works against major threats in the MIPV6.
6. Comparison of Two Techniques
Techniques work against the attacks so if we compare the approaches in terms of
cost of packets and the delays.  Referred to  Fig. 3, Mobile Node sends two Init
messages to  CN, so that to avoid from the  Amplification  and Reflection Attacks;
and CN sends two keys K0 and  K1  so  that  to  do  return-routability test for the
home  and the correspondent address. The Figure 4 compares two techniques in
terms of packets sent by each. Fig. 4(a) shows the number of packets sent in [6],
according to Fig. 3, where 4(b) shows the number of packets sent in our protocol,
according to Fig. 2(b). Its is shown clearly that total 7  packets are required for
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authenticating BU in 4(a),  where total of 6 packets are required in 4(b). Hence, our
protocol is better over [6], in terms of packets communicated for BU authentication.
Figure3.
Figure4a. Figure4b.
When a mobile node is being authenticated from a large number of correspondents,
then we can see the major difference between two protocols. When the MN
authenticates itself with the large number of correspondents, it sends as more
packets in [6], as the total number of CNs with which authentication occurs, than in
our protocol. When the authentication occurs between the MN and 10 CNs, then the
MN sends 70 packets in protocol [reference 6], whereas it send 60 packets in our
protocol So our protocol’s performance become significant against the protocol
described in [reference 6], when MN authenticates itself with greater number of
CNs. Authentication time in our protocol is less than to the one proposed in
[reference 6]. According to the  authentication process shown in the Figure 4, for
authentication, messages travel twice through  home agent in the protocol describe
in [reference 6],  whereas in our approach the packets pass only  once through home
agent. As we know that home agent tunnels the messages to the new care-of address
of the MN. So it takes some time to add tunneling header and encrypting the
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message.  This overhead is appeared twice in [reference 6], but once in our protocol.
Hence our protocol also reduces the delays.
7. Conclusions
In conclusion we have described how to make Mobile IPv6 route optimization
protocol more secure. While proposing this protocol, we kept in mind that the
Mobile IPv6 route optimization security design was never intended to be fully
secure. Instead, as we stated earlier, the goal was to be roughly as secure as Non
Mobile IPv4. We started from describing major threats faced by Mobile IPV6, and
then formulated our approach against these threats. The ideas presented in this
paper, is based on asymmetric cryptography without public key infrastructure. At
the end we compared our technique with the famous technique proposed in
[reference 6]. Our results show clearly that our protocol is better in performance,
with less delays and the less number of packets sent for authentication, which
proves the efficacy of our protocol. We hope that this work will help secure other
Internet mobility protocols as well.
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